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Writing

Scaling a design team: the slow half comes first

ยท Alex Zapadenko

Taking a design team from ten people to fifty took me just under five years. Ten to twenty took forty-one months of it. Twenty to fifty took eighteen. Nearly everything that made the fast half possible was built during the slow one, which is the part nobody asks about.

The dates are on my about page if you want to check them. I was a design manager at TheoremOne from June 2017, and the team went from ten to twenty in that stretch โ€” about one net hire every four months. From November 2020 to May 2022 the same team went from twenty to past fifty, roughly one net hire every eighteen days. Same company, same market, same person doing the hiring. Nearly seven times the rate.

What changed was not effort or budget. It was that by 2020 there was somewhere to put people.

The slow years bought four things, none of which look like growth on a headcount chart: lead roles, so there was a layer between me and everyone else; career frameworks, so a promotion was a decision about evidence rather than a negotiation; design operations, so staffing a project wasn't a conversation I personally had to be in; and engagement models, so a new client didn't require inventing a way of working. That's it. Four pieces of unglamorous scaffolding, and they took three and a half years mostly because I was building them while also doing the work.

The reason this matters is the failure mode on the other side. A team that hires ahead of its structure doesn't grow to fifty โ€” it grows to about twenty-five and then starts leaking. Everyone reports to one person who is now a full-time bottleneck; nobody can tell whether they're progressing; every new project relitigates process from scratch. The hires keep landing and the capacity doesn't move, which reads as a hiring quality problem and is actually a structural one.

I should be honest about what I didn't control. The company was growing hard toward five hundred people and was eventually acquired; the demand for designers was pulled by that, not manufactured by me. Plenty of teams build all the scaffolding and never get the second phase because the business never asks for it. Structure doesn't cause growth. It only determines whether you can absorb growth when it comes.

The clearest evidence came afterwards, and not from hiring at all. When TheoremOne was acquired and the design teams merged into a 200-person global practice at Monks, that integration closed in under nine months โ€” faster than any other function in the company. Not because design was better at mergers. Because leveling and career paths already existed on one side, so there was something to map onto instead of something to invent under deadline.

If you're being asked how fast you can double a design team, the useful answer is a question: what happens to the twenty-first person when they arrive? If you can't answer that in specifics, the hiring isn't the constraint yet.

I write about this sort of thing because judgment, not capacity, is usually what's actually missing.